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State v. Bundrant:
The Long Arm Reaches Seaward
A casual glance at the principles of federal exclusivity and preemption would create the impression that the high seas are no place for
a state to thrust its.jurisdiction. Nevertheless, there are times when the
state can assert its police power over American citizens on the high
seas while treaties simultaneously govern the conduct of foreign
nationals. In State v. Bundrant, 1 the Alaska Supreme Court reversed a
lower court decision -and upheld the power of that state to reach
beyond the traditional three-mile limit of state jurisdiction into the
Bering Sea to regulate crabbing by Americans regardless of whether
they were residents of Alaska or of another state. Nor did it matter
whether they were arrested within the three-mile limit or on the high
seas. This power to regulate crabbing was held to be unaffected by the
existence of treaties regulating commercial fishing in the same area by
2
foreign nationals.
Crabs are creatures who seem to be unbothered by concepts such
as "jurisdiction," "exclusitivity," and "pre-emption." Thus, they migrate irreverently back and forth across the three-mile state territorial
limit, periodically moving inland to mate and molt before moving
seaward again. Because of this migration, there are times when they
are deemed to be state property under the Submerged Lands Act
(SLA), 3 while at other times their "ownership" is questionable. This
presents a dilemma for the state. It has a proprietary interest in
protecting a resource of unquestionable value to the state; at the same
time its regulations would be useless if fishermen could merely wait
until the crabs moved beyond the three-mile limit to the state's
jurisdiction and then catch them with impunity.
To avoid depletion of the king crab population so vital to the
survival of the Alaska fisheries industry, 4 the Alaska Board of Fish and
Game (hereinafter referred to as the Board) began efforts to regulate
1546 P.2d 530 (Alaska 1976).
2
0f the eleven treaties relating to North Pacific fisheries, the most important ones
in light of this case include, Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet
Union Relating to Fishing for King Crab. Feb. 2, 1965, art. 1, 16 U.S.T.24, T.I.A.S. No.
5752; Agreement Between the United States and Soviet Union Relating to Fishing for
King and Tanner Crab, Feb. 21, 1973 art.1, 24 U.S.T. 603, T.I.A.S. No. 7571
(Extension: Dec. 31, 1974, 25 U.S.T. 3162, T.I.A.S. No. 7981); and Agreement Between
the United States and Japan Relating to Fishing for King and Tanner Crab, Dec. 20,
1972, 23 U.S.T. 3775, T.I.A.S. No. 7527. Although the Soviets are not currently
exercising their rights to a limited crabbing season east of the United States-Russia
Convention Line of 1867, the Japanese are. 546 P.2d at 537.
343 U.S.C. §1301-1315 (1970).
4
The dissent in Hjelle v. Brooks, 377 F. Supp. 430 (D.C. Alaska 1975), said:
The Bering Sea king crab population data obtained by the National Marine
Fisheries Service establishes that the present capacity for commercial fishermen to
take king crab far exceeds the estimated maximum sustained yield of the Bering
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crabbing in the Bering Sea in 1969.5 In 1973, the Board established a

maximum quota of 23 million pounds of crab for this area for the
1973-74 season 6 and prohibited the possession of crab taken in viola-

tion of the Board's rules and regulations. 7 This quota was met on
September 9, 1973, and the area was ordered closed until June 15,
1974.8
In December 1973, several crab fishermen brought suit in federal
court for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Board's
regulations. 9 In Hjelle v. Brooks, a three judge district court issued the

requested injunction. 10 The Board subsequently repealed the enjoined
regulations and on June 15, 1974, issued a new set of emergency

regulations. II Under these regulations, "statistical areas" were created
with different restrictions applying to each area. The area in which the
facts giving rise to Bundrant occurred was "Statistical Area Q," in an

"adjacent seaward biological influence zone" from sixteen to sixty
miles off the Alaska coast. 12
, Three individual cases were joined for trial in State v. Bundrant.
Bundrant was prosecuted for possession within Alaskan waters of crab
taken in a high seas area that had been closed to crabbing. 13 Bundrant
was a legal resident of Washington, but the court noted his several
contacts with Alaska, including maintenance of warehouses for pro-

cessing his catch. 14 Defendant Kaldestad was charged with possessing
crabs under the same statute, as well as with violating provisions of the

June 15 emergency regulations which prohibited the taking of king
Sea Shellfish area. Biologists generally agree that productivity of this fishery
cannot be sustained absent a regulatory scheme such as the plaintiffs presently
attack ...

Id. at 444 (dissenting opinion).

5
The "Bering Sea Ehellfish Area" was created by the Alaska Board of Fish and
Game in 5 A.A.C. 07.100, described as "... all waters of the Bering Sea ... north of
540 36' N. lat.,... south of 60r N. lat., and east of the U.S.-Russia Convention Line of
1867."

65 A.A.C. 07.760.

A.A.C. 36.040.
8546 P.2d at 533.
75
9

1d.

10377 F. Supp. 430.

11546 P.2d at 533, 534.

PId. at 534, 558.
13The applicable statute, ALASKA STAT. § 16.10. 200 (Supp. 1975), is Alaska's
"landing law." It provides:
It is unlawful for a person taking migratory fish and migratory shellfish in high
sea areas designated by the Board of Fisheries or in violation of the regulations
promulgated by the Board of Fisheries governing the taking of migratory fish or
migratory shellfish in the designated areas to possess, sell, offer to sell, barter,
give, or transport in the state, including the waters of the state, migratory fish or
migratory shellfish.
14546 P.2d at 534, 535.

52

N.C.

J. INT'L L.

& COMM. REG.

5

crab,' their possession,16 and the possession of crabbing equipment 17
during a closed season in an area subject to state regulation. 18 Fourteen
additional defendants, et al., were charged with counts similar to
Kaldestad. All but one of the fourteen were residents of Alaska.
Whether the state could legally prosecute these offenses depended
upon the constitutionality of the state's action in the Bering Sea, when
measured against a tangled history of judicial decisions, legislation,
and treaties.
At one time it was taken for granted that a coastal state could
assert jurisdiction over the waters within three miles of its shoreline. In
1947, however, this assumption was reversed in United States v.
California (First California) in favor of a three mile area of "territorial
sea" with exclusive federal jurisdiction. 19 Reacting to this decision,
Congress in 1953 reversed the result with the SLA, which gave title to
all lands and resources (including crabs) within three miles of the coast
to the states. 20 Thus, the boundaries of the coastal states were for all
intents and purposes moved three miles seaward. At about the same
time, Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA), which gave jurisdiction and control of the subsoil and
seabed of the continental shelf beyond the three-mile state limit to the
federal government. 2 1 In 1970, Congress passed the Bartlett Act, which
declared the United States' rights to control marine resources on the
continental shelf and prohibited the taking of these resources by
foreign nationals except by international agreement. 22 It was in this
the U.S.S.R. signed treaties
context that the United States, Japan, and
23
to regulate crabbing in the Bering Sea.

The Constitution grants the federal government authority to
regulate interstate commerce and to manage foreign relations. 24 That
the regulations involved in Bundrant affected interstate commerce was
unquestioned, but the Alaska Supreme Court turned to the touchstone
155 A.A.C. 34.910.
16
5 A.A.C. 34.090(c).
17
5 A.A.C.34.095.
18

546 P.2d at 558.
19332 U.S. 19 (1946).
2043 U.S.C. §§1301-15 (1970). The Statehood Act, 48 U.S.C. Prec. §21 (1970), made
the Submerged Lands Act applicable to Alaska.
2143 U.S.C. §§1331-43 (1970). §1332 provides:
(a) It is declared tobe the policy of the United States that the subsoil and seabed of
the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its
jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition as provided in this subchapter.
(b) This subchapter shall be construed in such manner that the character as high
seas of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf and the right to navigation
and fishing therein shall not be affected.
2216 U.S.C. §§1081-86 (1970).
23
See discussion supra note 2.
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8; art. If,
§1; art. VI.
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in Cooley v. Board of Wardens 25 to determine whether the interest
involved was predominantly local or national. They then weighed the
competing state and national interests, using the balancing test prescribed in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona. 26 By this process, the court
found that crabbing was not an appropriate activity for national
uniform regulation. 27Neither was there any likelihood of retaliation by
sister states, nor any direct and significant effect on more than one
state. 28 There is, as the court found, "a residuum of power in the state
to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in
some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent,
regulate it

....

"29

Because depletion of the state's crab population

would have an adverse effect on the state's already critical employment
situation and deplete a vital local food source, the court found
a
30
legitimate state interest in the promulgation of the regulations.
A state cannot enter the domain of international affairs withouat
running afoul of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, since
power over external affairs is vested exclusively in the national
government.3 1 The court in Bundrant, however, declined to adopt the
position that any intrusion at all by the state into international affairs
was prohibited. Instead, it relied on the analysis in Zschernig v. Miller,
which held that the statute in question had to. have more than some
incidental or indirect effect on the affairs of foreign countries, in order
to be considered invalid. 32 Therefore, the Bundrant court balanced the
state's interest in the regulations against those regulations' impact on
United States foreign affairs in the same way that local and national
interests are balanced in terms of their effect on interstate commerce. 33
Since the Board's regulations were not applied against foreign nation2s53 U.S.(12 How.) 298 (1852). The balance to be struck in weighing the effect on
interstate commerce was thus stated to be: "Whatever subjects of this power are in
their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may
justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress." Id.
at 319.
26325 U.S. 761 (1945).
27546 P.2d at 539. This is discussed in T. SUHER & K. HENNESSEE. STATE AND
FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS IN THE REGULATION OF UNITED STATES COASTAL WAT-

12-14 (1974).
28546 P.2d at 539-40; Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925).
29546 P.2d at 540; 325 U.S. at 761.
30546 P.2d at 540-41. An old series of cases examining the commerce clause has
shown favor to regulations which protect local food sources. E.g., Rasmussen v.
Idaho, 181 U.S. 198 (1901); But see Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
31
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
32389 U.S. 429, 432-433 (1968). But see Gorum v. Fall, 393 U.S. 398 (1968). See
generally Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Common Law on Private International
ERS

Matters, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 133 (1971).
33546 P.2d at 542.
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als whose crabbing activities are governed solely by treaty, they were
not prohibited by the supremacy clause.
The mere fact that federal legislation exists in a particular area is
insufficient to pre-empt any state action in the area. 3 4 On the high seas
especially, the courts have asserted the position that although the
federal government has paramount authority, their jurisdiction is not
exclusive. In the absence of conflicting federal legislation or regulations, the state may regulate fishing in territorial and nonterritorial
waters. 35 The question for the court therefore became one of whether
state action in the Bering Sea beyond the three-mile limit had been
pre-empted in some manner.
Had the term "subsoil and seabed," as used in the OCSLA,
included natural resources such as fish and crabs, the federal government would unquestionably have had exclusive jurisdiction of the
continental shelf beyond the state's three-mile zone. But by explicating
the wording of both the SLA and the OCSLA, the court found that the
OCSLA applied only to mineral resources, while the SLA included
both mineral. and natural, resources. 36 In addition, the OCSLA dis37
claims any effect on fisheries.
None of the events subsequent to the enactment of the OCSLA
have pre-empted the states' authority to regulate fisheries on the
continental shelf. The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf gives
"sovereign rights" to coastal nations to exploit natural resources on the
continental shelf; by definition of the Convention, "natural resources"
includes sedentary species such as crabs. This fact, although indicative
of the federal government's authority to regulate crabbing, evidences
no intent on the part of Congress to pre-empt the states from
exercising this power. 38 Likewise, there is no indication of federal
pre-emption in the 1973 Agreement Between the United States and the
Soviet Union on king and tanner crabs, 39 which adopted the Convention's definition of natural resources as including crabs. 40 For these
reasons, the court found lacking any clear intent to pre-empt state
action in regulating crabbing, and it therefore invoked the traditional
presumption in favor of constitutionality and validity of acts of its own
legislature.
34

41

Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
36546 P.2d at 544-46. As evidence of Congress' intent in enacting the OCSLA, the
court noted the remarks of Senator Douglas: "We are not particularly interested in
kelp, or shrimp or oysters, those are sideshows. The question is as to oil and gas. (99
CONG. REC. at 2868 (1953))." 546 P.2d at 546 n.66.
37Supra note 2.
38546 P.2d at 546.
39
Supra note 2.
40546 P.2d at 546.
41
d. at 548.
35
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Since neither the doctrines of pre-emption nor that of exclusivity
precluded the state's exercise of power beyond the three-mile territorial limit, the issue then became the extent to which the state could
stretch its authority seaward. The State proposed, and the court
ultimately accepted, a split concept of jurisdiction based on the terms
"imperium" and "dominium. '4 2 Within the three-mile limit, the state
has dominium; seaward of that line, the federal government has
dominium. But within the area of federal dominium, the state is not
precluded from exercising imperium, or political jurisdiction so long as
there is a sufficient .nexus between the regulations and some legitimate
state interest. 43 Prior judicial opinions have dealt extensively with this
concept, but none have done so as explicitly as the Bundrant court. In
Skiriotes v. Florida,44 for example, the Court considered the validity of
an arrest by Florida officials of the defendant for illegal sponge diving
beyond the three-mile limit. There the Court said:
"If the United States may control conduct of its citizens on tle
high seas, we see no reason why the State of Florida may not
likewise govern the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with
respect to matters in which the State has a legitimate
interest and
45
where there is no conflict with acts of Congress.

The court resolved the issue in favor of the state by relying on the
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the subject, United
States v. Alaska. 46 There the Supreme Court marked the difference
between the historical exercise of territorial dominium and the state's
regulation of fisheries and wildlife:
Our conclusion that the fact of enforcement of game and fish
regulations in Cook Inlet is inadequate, as a matter of law, to
establish historic title to the inlet as inland waters is not based on
mere technicality. The assertion of national jurisdiction over coastal waters for purposes of fisheries management frequently differs
in geographic extent from the boundaries claimed as inland or even
territorial waters. See, e. g., Presidential Proclamation No. 2668, 59
Stat. 885 (1945). This limited circumscription on the traditional
freedom of fishing on the high seas is based, in part, on a
recognition of the special interest that a coastal state has in the
preservation of the living resources in the high seas adjacent to its
territorial sea. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
42"Dominium, a concept that derives from Roman law, denotes ownership and
property rights, while imperium concerns regulatory power or control over a geographical area without reference to ownership. United States v. California (First
California), 332 U.S. 19 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)." 546 P.2d at 559 n.1
(dissenting opinion).
43546 P.2d at 548.
44313 U.S. 69 (1941).
45313 U.S. at 77. Subsequent cases have developed and extended Skiriotes. The
court in People v. Foretich, 92 Cal. Rptr. 481, 487, 14 Cal App. 3d Supp. 6 (1970), held
that the exercise of the state's jurisdiction beyond the three-mile limit did not conflict
with the 12-mile Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act, 16 U.S.C. §§1091-94 (1970).
46422 U.S. 184 (1975).
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Living Resources 47
of the High Seas, Art. 6,
TIAS 5969 (1966).

1, 17 U.S.T. 138, 141,

In one major respect the court in Bundrant was explicit in going
beyond the reach of the state's police power presented in Skiriotes and
the cases that have followed it. By relying on a single case from the
48
Maryland Supreme Court, Jacobson v. Maryland Racing Commission,
the Court was able to broaden the Skiriotes concept of "citizen" to
include all American nationals. 49 This was accomplished by extracting
from Jacobson the principle that acts done outside a jurisdiction which
produce detrimental effects inside it justify the state in punishing he
who caused the harm as if he had been present at the place of its
effect. 50
Conclusion
Jurisdictional conflicts will naturally arise in an area where there
are overlapping state, federal, and international interests. With the
annual harvest of king crab eclipsing the annual sustained yield of the
Bering Sea area, and with the heavy dependence of the local economy
upon the crabbing industry, regulation of the Bering Sea by some
governmental agency is crucial. Because of the historical deference
shown by federal agencies to fisheries regulation by the individual
states, 5 1 the burden of providing a regulatory scheme in this case fell
52
upon the Alaska Board of Fish and Game.
Pervasive throughout the opinion was a fear on the part of the
court that Alaska's fishing regulations would be seen as a unilateral
extension of sovereignty over coastal fisheries beyond the 12-mile limit
recognized in the 12-Mile Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act.5 3 In his

dissent, Justice Connor expressed concern that the court's holding
would disrupt deliberations of the Conference on the Law of the Sea
471d. at 198.

48261 Md. 180, 274 A.2d 102 (1971). InJacobson, the defendant violated a rule of the
Maryland Racing Commission by selling three horses within sixty days of a claiming
race. His racing license was suspended, and the action was upheld by the courts
against Jacobson's defense that the illegal sales had occurred outside the state and
therefore were not subject to state regulation.
49546 P.2d at 555.
soSee also Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911); United States v. Aluminum
Company of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS
OF LAWS §65 (1971). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §18 (1965).

5
sSee Browning, Some Aspects of State and FederalJurisdiction in the Marine Environment, 3 THE LAW OF THE SEA 89 (L. Alexander ed. 1968).
52
T. SUHER & K. HENNESSEE, supra note 27. Pointing to the dilemma faced by the

states in conserving their natural marine resources, former Massachusetts Governor
Francis Sargent stated, in announcing the state's new 200-mile lobster control act, "I
realize also that it raises certain constitutional questions. However, there is no time
for delay." Id. at 10 n.70.
5316 U.S.C. §§ 1091-94. See Comment, FisheriesJurisdictionalConflicts Beyond the
TerritorialSea-With Special Reference to the Policy of the United States, 44 WASH. L. REv.

307(1968).
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and encourage other coastal nations to follow the examples of Peru,
Brazil, and Chile by unilaterally extending their territorial jurisdiction
to a 200-mile fishing zone. In this regard, he said: "In terms of
international complications, Alaska's assertion of imperium cannot be
distinguished from the assertion of dominium by certain Latin American
states."'5 4 Other states have not been so cautious. Maine, for example,
declared its ownership and control over the living resources of the sea
within 200 miles, "or to the. farthest edge of the Continental Shelf,
whichever is the greatest [sic]" 5 5 Massachusetts and New Hampshire
have similar statutes.
Less than three months after the Bundrant opinion was issued,
however, many of these fears were allayed by the enactment of the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 on April 13, 1976. 56
This Act will extend the fisheries jurisdiction of the United States from
12 miles, as provided in the superceded 12-Mile Contiguous Fisheries
Zone Act, to 200 miles. This will become effective on March 1, 1977,
barring any significant developments
in the United Nations Confer57
ence on the Law of the Sea.

A question that must be addressed is whether the Bundrant
holding was made moot by enactment of the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act. Although analysis of the Act is beyond the scope of
this note, this writer suggests that the opinion Will remain a vital one.
The Act claims for the United States exclusive fishery management
authority in the sea area within 200 miles of the coastline.58 As used in
the Act, the term "exclusive authority" seems to mean, primarily,
authority exclusive of other nations. The main thrust of the Act is
60
59
directed at regulation of foreign fishing. Subchapter HI of the Act,

which provides for the implementation of state fishery management
plans, is drafted so loosely that existing management schemes, such as
that promulgated by the Alaska Board, may very likely continue
without modification. 6 1 The Bundrant opinion will no doubt shape and

54546 P.2d at 562.
55904 - L.O. 1192 (June 19, 1973); See T. SUHER & K. HENNESSEE, supra note 27,
14-15.
5616 U.S.C.A. §1801 et seq. (1976 Supp 2, Part 1).
57
See 16 U.S.C.A. §1881.
5816 U.S.C.A. §1812.
59

See 16 U.S.C.A. §§1821-25, 1881.
16 U.S.C.A. §§185i-6.
61
See 16 U.S.C.A. §1856, which provides that nothing in the Act shall be
construed as extending or diminishing the jurisdiction of any state within its
boundaries, except as prbvided in that section. Presumably, the state's plan would
have to meet approval by the regional council, but this should present no difficulty
since the requirements of the Act Are broad enough to accomodate plans already in
existence.
60

58
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be shaped by future implementation and litigation under the Act. In
the meantime, the opinion demonstrates a rare example of state police
power coexisting with interstate commerce and federal regulation of
external affairs, as Alaska ventures into high seas resource management and conservation.
WOODY CONNETTE

